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Competition Law & Human Rights: Striking A Balance Between Business Freedom 
And Regulatory Intervention 
Arianna Andreangeli

 
The protection of genuine competition represents a key objective for policy makers and law 
enforcers both at EU and at domestic level.  However, the more proactive and incisive 
approach adopted by the European Commission toward enforcement raises several issues for 
the position of the parties affected by competition investigations.  For a number of years, a 
lively and often strongly worded debate has been taking place as to the “fairness” of 
competition proceedings before the Commission.  Tensions between freedom of enterprise 
and the protection of genuine competition have also become apparent in light of the 
considerable limits placed on the exercise of intellectual property rights enjoyed by a 
dominant undertaking.  Consequently, an underlying question emerges as to where a line 
should be drawn between the pursuit of competition through administrative action and the 
effective protection of business freedom. 
         This paper will analyse some of the implications of a stronger competition enforcement 
framework for the rights enjoyed by the business entities affected by EU competition 
enforcement. The first part will consider the rationale at the basis of the application of 
“human rights-type” guarantees to corporate actors and the extent to which the current 
procedural safeguards are sufficient to fulfil the standards of due process enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights.   
         The second part will address the questions arising from the impact of antitrust remedies 
on the property rights enjoyed by undertakings found to have infringed the competition rules 
against the background of their right to peacefully enjoy their “possessions” and to freely 
stipulate contracts.  This chapter concludes that remedies entailing the obligation to license 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) to third parties may actually not be entirely consistent with 
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the standards enshrined in Article 1, Protocol I to the Convention as well as with rule of law 
principles.   
                                                                                                                                                  
I. Prelude: Competition Enforcement Between Effectiveness & Procedural “Fairness” 
1. Preliminary observations 
Competition policy lies at the core of the tasks of the European Union and requires 
the establishment and the operation of an effective framework for its implementation. For this 
purpose, the Commission enjoys extensive fact-finding and sanctioning powers.
1
 In addition, 
Council Regulation No 1/2003 provides an express legal basis for the imposition of antitrust 
remedies. The 2003 reform also has pushed toward the decentralised application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU to individual cases, thus boosting the involvement of national competition 
agencies and national courts,
2
 and strengthening the cooperation among the competent 
agencies.
3
  
     Regulation No 1/2003 enshrines an obligation to provide information on new cases 
(Article 11) and confers to the Commission and the NCAs the power to exchange and use as 
evidence information gathered in the course of investigations (Article 12) and to carry out 
investigative measures on their reciprocal behalf. To ensure the smooth operation of these 
features, the Member States envisaged the creation of the European Competition Network 
(ECN). Established via an informal declaration in 2003, the ECN provides an “unofficial” 
space for the circulation of information and the resolution of issues arising from parallel 
investigations.
4
 However, due to its very nature, it does not act as a “clearing house” in the 
event of conflicts arising from multiple investigations pending in two or more jurisdictions or 
operate according to a uniform set of binding rules as to the collection and the transmission of 
evidence.
5
 According to Council Regulation No 1/2003, each NCA is only subject to the law 
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in force in its own jurisdiction.
6
 It follows that once evidence has been gathered in 
compliance with the applicable evidentiary rules, it can be transmitted to and used by a 
different authority regardless of any different, perhaps more protective legal standards, in 
force in the receiving jurisdiction.
7
 
     Six years since the full entry into force of the Modernisation Regulation have seen a 
number of successful antitrust decisions adopted by the Commission.
8
 However, they have 
not quelled the debate concerning the question of how to reconcile the current structure for 
the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU with the observance of the human rights rules 
enshrined in the general principles of EU law.
9
 The circumstance that the Commission acts as 
investigator, prosecutor and judge in the cases it deals with and that its decisions are only 
subject to limited review as regards their substance, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, 
have prompted a number commentators to argue that the existing procedural rules would 
threaten the effective protection of the rights of “due process” enjoyed by the investigated 
parties and should consequently be radically reformed.
10
 As a result, a question emerges as to 
how far these powers of investigation and sanction can actually go achieve a “fair balance” 
between the exercise of public power and the respect for the fundamental guarantees enjoyed 
by the investigated parties.
11
 These questions will be addressed in the following sections. 
  
2. The European Convention on Human Rights and EU competition proceedings—brief 
remarks 
This section briefly discusses the question of whether the features of EU competition 
proceedings can be reconciled with a number of fundamental rights and principles, such as 
the right to a “fair hearing,” which demands, inter alia, that decisions affecting the 
determination of “civil rights or obligations” or “criminal charges” be adopted in accordance 
with canons of independence and impartiality.
12
 The remit of this chapter does not allow for 
an exhaustive discussion of the scope and the degree of protection granted to fundamental 
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rights by EU law. The Court of Justice has elaborated autonomous human rights’ safeguards 
as part of the general principles of EC/EU law and has acknowledged that instruments such 
as the ECHR play a significant role in inspiring the interpretation of these principles.
13
 The 
central position of the ECHR was confirmed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which is now legally binding on the Union institutions as well as on domestic authorities 
when they act within the scope of EU law.
14
  
     The primary aim of the ECHR was to protect natural persons against state abuses. 
Nonetheless, some suggest that the reliance on the part of the ECHR on the rule of law as a 
“cluster of principles” encompassing democracy, human dignity and personal freedom can 
provide a justification for the extension of some of its rules to corporate actors involved in 
commercial activities.
15
 Although public authorities, including supranational bodies, remain 
entitled to intervene in the private activities of individuals or corporate entities, they can only 
do so within precise limits.
16
 According to Hayek, the rule of law dictates that each 
expression of public power affecting the rights of individuals or legal entities must have a 
legal basis provided by sufficiently precise, clear and accessible rules and be constrained in 
accordance with canons of proportionality, equality and non-arbitrariness.
17
  
     Yet, despite being compatible with personal freedom and with the values of a democratic 
society, the market could not be left completely unbridled but should be subject to “carefully 
thought out legal frameworks” aimed at steering competition toward the public interest.18 
Indeed, the presence in the ECHR of due process rules, of provisions defending the privacy 
of the home and of correspondence and the protection of property rights, albeit within limits 
dictated by the public interest and assessed in each case by the competent public authorities, 
are fully compatible with the “objective values” enshrined in the rule of law.19  
     This conclusion has very important consequences for commercial actors
20
 who, due to 
their involvement in the market within “welfare states,” are exposed to the impact of the 
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operation of potentially pervasive regulatory frameworks.
21
 However, the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights suggests that the intensity of the protection afforded to 
entities active in the commercial arena must be carefully assessed and framed in such a way 
as to avoid irremediably hampering the effectiveness of these regulatory structures.
22
 In this 
context, the Court took the view that the Convention would allow for a somehow more 
“lenient” approach to be applied in respect to the protection of rights enjoyed by commercial 
entities.
23
 At the same time, it emphasised that these constraints are only legitimate if they 
have a clear, foreseeable and accessible legal basis and are imposed in accordance with 
principles of non-arbitrariness and proportionality and after a procedure allowing those 
affected by them an opportunity to present their views and objections.
24
  
     In the light of the above analysis, the ECHR provides for the protection of a number of 
fundamental safeguards to corporate entities engaged in commercial activities, in accordance 
with the rule of law. However, the remit of the ECHR cannot be determined “in isolation,” 
but must always take into account the context in which its application is invoked and the 
values and principles affected by the alleged interference.
25
 Consequently, a question 
emerges as to how to strike a balance between effective regulation of economic activities and 
the respect for those human rights which, thanks to the “objective values” on which the 
ECHR is based, are enjoyed by commercial actors. Some of these issues will be examined in 
the following sections.  
 
II. Human Rights’ Protection In Antitrust Procedure: Between Effective Enforcement & Due 
Process Standards 
1. Protecting the rights of the defence in competition investigations: the example of the 
privilege against self-incrimination 
The previous section briefly analysed the rationale for the extension of human rights 
protection to entities affected by the exercise of regulatory powers and argued that, while 
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public authorities should be allowed a margin of discretion in implementing their policy of 
regulation of the economy, they are obliged to strike a careful balance between the effective 
exercise of their function and the protection of fundamental entitlements enjoyed by the 
affected parties. 
     These considerations play an even more important role in competition proceedings. These 
proceedings, despite being conducted in “administrative frameworks” and not before the 
courts, are “criminal” in nature, given both their general applicability in the public interest 
and the deterrent and punitive nature of the sanctions that can be imposed for their 
infringement.
26
 Accordingly, the proceedings leading to their application should be subjected 
to stringent standards as regards the hearing of the suspected infringers and the adoption of 
the final decisions.
27
 However, to what extent the needs of effective competition enforcement 
and more generally of the efficient functioning of regulatory structures can be balanced 
against the respect of due process guarantees compatible with the ECHR in similar cases 
remains an open question.  
     This tension is particularly apparent regarding the different approaches adopted with 
respect to the protection of the right not to incriminate oneself in “criminal cases” before the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU. The right to remain 
silent was recognised by the Strasbourg Court in Funke as one of the “international standards 
that lie at the heart of the concept of a fair trial” primarily to protect the integrity of the will 
of an accused against forms of improper compulsion in the taking of evidence.
28
 Statements 
taken from the accused on pain of sanction for failure to cooperate and therefore “in the 
defiance of the will of the suspect”29 could not later be used against him in separate criminal 
proceedings since the evidence had been obtain by coercion.
30
  
     In the recent O’ Halloran and Francis case the European Court of Human Rights 
emphasised that while the right to a “fair trial” was in itself absolute, what actually made a 
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“fair trial,” i.e., its features, including the right to remain silent, should be assessed in each 
case in light of the legal context in which they are to operate.
31
 The circumstances of the case, 
the nature and the objectives of the proceedings and the intensity of the coercion exercised in 
taking the evidence would have to be carefully appraised.
32
  
     Particularly for evidence obtained in the course of “regulatory” proceedings, the 
Strasbourg Court emphasised that individuals choosing to perform specific activities may be 
required to submit to “responsibilities and obligations as part of [a] regulatory regime,” which 
could also involve the duty to provide the authorities with potentially self-incriminating 
information and a corresponding restriction of their right to remain silent.
33
 To conform to the 
ECHR, the Contracting States’ competent authorities would have to demonstrate that the 
applicable rules respected the “essence” of these rights.34 
     By contrast, the Court of Justice of the EU held in Orkem
35
 that firms affected by 
competition proceedings, despite not being entitled to “evade the Commission’s 
investigations”, enjoyed a limited degree of protection against self-incrimination in the course 
of their preliminary stages to avoid impairing irremediably their rights of the defence.
36
 Even 
though the Commission officials could compel the investigated parties to provide all the 
factual information that may be known to them, regardless of the circumstance that it could 
be used as evidence against them,
37
 they could not oblige the undertakings to give “answers 
which might involve an admission […] of the existence of an infringement which is 
incumbent on the Commission to prove.”38 To adopt a more extensive reading of the 
privilege would pose an unjustified obstacle to the Commission’s performance of its 
function.
39
 
     Whereas the Strasbourg Court focuses on the nature and intensity of the coercive powers 
exercised to extract the evidence and on the procedural safeguards assisting that exercise, to 
ensure that the investigated parties’ right to a “fair trial” is not tainted by improper forms of 
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oppression on their will,
40
 the Court of Justice of the EU restricts the scope of the privilege to 
evidence taken as a result of direct coercion (e.g., financial penalties) and takes as its 
“starting point” the substance of the questions directed at the investigated parties, i.e., 
whether they are merely of a “factual nature” or can lead to the admission of responsibility 
for the alleged infringement.
41
  
     Consequently, once a question concerns the existence of facts—even though the answer 
may allow the investigating officials to draw strong inferences of the undertakings’ 
responsibility—the Commission officials may demand an answer to it.42 Can the approach 
adopted in EU law can be reconciled with the human rights standards enshrined in the 
Convention?  After the O’ Halloran judgment in the Strasbourg Court could justify the 
adoption of a more “nuanced” view of the components of the right to a “fair trial” in the 
regulatory arena.
43
  
     Even taking into account the need to avoid jeopardising the effectiveness of these 
regulatory structures and the circumstance that competition investigations tend to involve 
legal entities,
44
 the approach to the privilege adopted by the Court of Justice of the EU may 
not be entirely capable of striking a “fair balance” between the public interest and the need to 
preserve the essence of the undertakings’ rights of the defence and may therefore have to be 
restrained to adhere more closely to the Convention.
45
 The scope of the right to remain silent 
should prevent the disclosure of self-incriminating information when it appears from the 
circumstances of the case that the degree of coercion exerted on the investigated parties was 
excessive or the safeguards attending the investigations have not been observed.
46
 
     The different principles and objectives characterising the EU and the ECHR legal systems 
have led to the adoption, in the respective jurisdictions, of different standards for the 
protection of human rights within regulatory frameworks. However, it is beyond doubt that 
although the effective enforcement of the Treaty competition rules constitutes a primary 
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objective, its implementation should not go as far as to defy the essence of the undertakings’ 
rights of the defence and should ensure that appropriate limitations to the Commission’s 
powers are in place to avoid procedural abuses, in accordance with the principles enshrined in 
the rule of law, to which the EU institutions are committed.  
2. The decentralised application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the need for 
“foreseeability” in competition enforcement 
Section 2.1 pointed out that Council Regulation No 1/2003 strongly moved toward the 
decentralised application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to individual cases. According to 
Article 5 of the Regulation, NCAs are now empowered to apply the Treaty competition rules 
to individual cases.
47
 However, they do so in a radically changed landscape, characterised by 
their cooperation with the Commission and with one another within the ECN.
48
  
     Since practices covered by Treaty antitrust rules have (or are likely to have), by definition, 
an impact on trade between Member States, they are capable of adversely affecting 
competition in markets falling within the jurisdiction of more than one NCA and therefore the 
framework established by the Modernisation Regulation is characterised by the possibility of 
parallel proceedings.
49
 However, although cases are likely to be taken on by the authority or 
authorities that are “well-placed” to deal with the allegations50 and may be “seized” by the 
Commission only, in accordance with Article 11(6) of the Regulation,
51
 parallel jurisdiction 
raises a number of issues for the protection of the rights of the defence and especially for the 
respect of the principle of ne bis in idem. 
     Article 4, Protocol VII to the ECHR enshrines this principle and recognises it as belonging 
to the general principles of Community law by the Court of Justice.
52
 Article 50 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights also confirms this principle.
53
 Nonetheless, Regulation 1/2003 
does not expressly protect ne bis in idem. Regulation 1/2003 is not only based on the 
principle of parallel jurisdiction, but reiterates also that a decision adopted by NCAs will not 
preclude the Commission or another national agency from taking action in respect to the 
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same infringement.
54
 The rationale behind this difference is that since EU and domestic 
competition rules fulfil different policy objectives and their application addresses only those 
anti-competitive effects that occur within the jurisdiction of each individual authorities, the 
principle of ne bis in idem would not be applicable to prevent double prosecution on the part 
of the Commission
55
 and would only be subject to the duty for the Commission to take in to 
account any earlier penalty in assessing the entity of the fine it wished to impose.
56
      
     However, the European Court of Human Rights has taken the different view that the 
principle of ne bis in idem aims to prevent the repetition of criminal proceedings that have 
been concluded by a final decision.
57
 Consequently, according to the European Court of 
Human Rights, this rule should be read as containing a right not only not to be sanctioned 
twice, but also not to be investigated and prosecuted twice for the same infringement.
58
 
Against this background, one may doubt that the possibility of parallel investigations 
envisaged by Council Regulation No 1/2003 could be regarded as being consistent with the 
ECHR
59
 or with Article 50 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, according to which no-
one may be tried and punished twice for the same offence “within the Union”60 and 
regardless of whether its effects may be felt within the jurisdiction of different enforcement 
authorities.
61
  
     The needs of the meaningful enforcement of the Treaty antitrust rules require effective 
enforcement action.
62
 However, even taking into account these important objectives, the very 
notion of parallel jurisdiction appears to fall short of the requirements of the rule of law
63
 
since it would not allow the investigated parties to identify the competent authority
64
 and 
expose them to the risk of later prosecution “elsewhere” within the ECN.65  
     The Commission can, whenever a case raises issues of “Community interest” and has a 
clear “transnational dimension,” seize jurisdiction over it and thus pre-empt other agencies 
from examining its merits or inflict sanctions on the firms found to be responsible for the 
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antitrust infringement in question. However, it has no obligation to take this action. 
Consequently, it is unclear whether the current rules are capable of eliminating any of the 
concerns for the respect of the ne bis in idem rule, outlined above.
66
 
     Accordingly, Council Regulation No 1/2003 should be reformed so as to preclude NCAs 
from launching further investigations in respect to allegations of anti-competitive behavior 
that have already been “disposed of” by other enforcement agencies and a fortiori by the 
European Commission,
67
 unless the alleged “second” offence does not have “essential 
elements” in common with the one already being dealt with.68  
     The very system of parallel competences characterising the Modernisation Regulation 
raises concerns for the protection of the investigated parties against double jeopardy
69
 and 
seems to depart from the principles of foreseeability and legal certainty enshrined in the rule 
of law. The system should provide a rule of “administrative” res judicata precluding NCAs 
from taking action in respect to infringements that have already been investigated and 
sanctioned in other jurisdictions.  
 
III. Human Rights Protection & Antitrust Remedies: Limiting Economic Freedom for the 
Purpose of Promoting Genuine Competition? 
1. Human rights and the free market: the interplay between the peaceful enjoyment of 
property and Article 102 remedies in IP cases 
    The right to enjoy one’s property, despite not being absolute, is protected by the 
Convention.
70
 It is therefore indispensable to confine the discretion of public authorities to 
“alter property rights in unpredictable ways” in the public interest.71 According to Article 1 of 
Protocol I to the ECHR, everyone has the right to the “peaceful enjoyment” of his or her 
possessions,
72
 i.e., tangible and intangible goods,
73
 including intellectual property rights
74
 
and, albeit within limits, legal claims,
75
 this right may either be forfeited altogether or can be 
constrained or “controlled” in its exercise.76 
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     However, these constraints should have an express legal basis, pursue a legitimate aim in 
the public interest and bear a relationship of proportionality between the needs of the public 
at large and the protection of the rights of the individuals or legal entities concerned by the 
exercise of the public power in the circumstances.
77
 The presence of appropriate procedural 
rights, the availability of compensation for the deprivation of property or of adequate 
remuneration in case of constraints being placed on their exercise are key aspects in this 
assessment.
78
 
     In relation to interferences with intellectual property rights, the Strasbourg Court held in 
Balan that the respondent state infringed the Convention by making repeated use of the 
applicant’s copyrighted work despite his opposition and without paying any remuneration.79 
The Court held that the public interest could have equally been served by paying the 
applicant reasonable royalties.
80
 The now defunct Human Rights Commission in the Smith 
Kline and French Laboratories v the Netherlands case,
81
 which was the subject of a friendly 
settlement,
82
 examined the compatibility of forced copyright licenses.      
     The Commission held that the grant of a “compulsory licence” constituted a form of 
“control on the use of property” of the patent holder83 since it constrained “the sole right of 
exploitation” of the invention, granted to its owner.84 Consequently, it was indispensable to 
assess whether a forced licence was consistent with the Convention, i.e. whether it was 
“prescribed by law” and sought to achieve “a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.”85  
     The Commission pointed to the circumstance that patent rights were limited in many 
Contracting States and that the latter enjoyed a significant margin of appreciation.
86
 It 
emphasised, however, that forced licences could only be granted to “encourage technological 
and economic development” and if as a result of the disclosure of the invention it could be 
expected that a “new product or process […] capable of industrial application” could have 
been developed and supplied on the market.
87
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     On the merits, the Commission found that the licence was limited in scope to what was 
necessary to allow the party requiring it to employ its own invention
88
 and that the holder of 
the “primary” patent had been entitled to royalties, thus establishing a reasonable link of 
proportionality between that legitimate aim and the restriction imposed on the applicant’s 
rights.
89
 Therefore, the Commission, after declaring the application admissible, expressed the 
view that the respondent state had not infringed the applicant’s right to enjoy its intellectual 
property.
90
 
     The above analysis supports the view that the Convention rules will apply to IPRs. 
However, it also identifies several issues that are peculiar to this type of property. As the 
Human Rights Commission recognised in Smith Kline, one of the key attributes of IP rights is 
the conferral of a de facto monopoly to their holder in respect to the possibility to duplicate a 
valuable “product” as a means to rewarding the investment made by the owner. Nonetheless, 
this “monopoly could overtime hamper the creativity” of third parties and therefore justify 
imposing limits on it to further genuine innovation.
91
  
     However, the rules governing these restrictions must be sufficiently clear and foreseeable. 
Each decision must also be adopted after having given the owner of the right a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard and must provide for adequate compensation in the form of 
reasonable royalties. Perhaps most importantly, the parties seeking to exploit the patent at 
issue must demonstrate that the compulsory licence would be likely to further innovation, by 
allowing them to manufacture a product displaying sufficiently “novel” features.92  
     Consequently, although the ECHR protects property rights, including those concerning 
patents, trademarks and copyright, there may be a number of reasons why it is legitimate for 
the Contracting States to limit their scope in order to further other objectives of public 
interest. These limits must comport to the principles provided by Article 1, Protocol I to the 
Convention.  
14 
 
 
IV. Economic Freedom, Competition Enforcement & Antitrust Remedies: How To Strike A 
“Fair Balance” Against Powerful Undertakings? 
1. Behavioral antitrust remedies, compulsory licences and the right to “peacefully enjoy 
one’s possessions”: Are the Commission’s powers consistent with the ECHR? 
A number of questions may be raised in relation to the power enjoyed by the 
European Commission to “bring an infringement to an end” by imposing significant limits on 
the right of “powerful” firms to choose how to conduct themselves on the market.93 In several 
decisions, especially concerning the application of Article 102 TFEU, the Commission has 
obliged dominant undertakings to “share” their own tangible property, such as transport 
infrastructures,
94
 to enter into supply relations with other firms, even if that may prima facie 
be incompatible with their commercial interests
95
 or ultimately to grant IP licences to their 
competitors in order to ensure that the latter may remain active on a relevant market in which 
their own proprietary technology has become “essential” to operate profitably.96  
    This section will consider whether the current approach to the remedies imposed by the 
Commission in “refusals to licence” cases is compatible with the standards of protection 
enjoyed by the peaceful enjoyment of property under the European Convention. According to 
Article 7 of the Modernisation Regulation, the Commission enjoys the power to impose on 
the undertakings responsible for an antitrust breach such remedies that may be necessary to 
terminate the infringement and are proportionate to it.
97
  
     Thus, the Commission can, after having found a violation of the Treaty antitrust rules, 
require the undertaking or undertakings responsible for it to modify their future behavior or, 
in exceptional cases, their structure in order to restore the status quo ante the competition 
infringement.
98
 Paramount to the framing of antitrust remedies is the application of principles 
of “necessity” and of “proportionality”. The concept of “necessity” requires the antitrust 
authorities to design each remedy in the light of the type of infringement, as determined by 
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the relevant substantive rules.
99
 Compliance with the principle of proportionality, instead, 
demands that the remedy constitute the only suitable means to bring the infringement to an 
end and that there be any less burdensome alternative to it.
100
 
     It is clear from its text that Regulation No 1/2003 uses language which, at least on its face, 
is very similar to that adopted by the Strasbourg court. However, what is not clear is whether 
the standards adopted in the EU are as exacting as those enshrined in the ECHR.
 101
 The 
Court of Justice had been reluctant to impose on dominant companies an obligation to grant 
IP licenses to their rivals.
102
 Refusals to license would only infringe Article 102 in 
“exceptional circumstances,” i.e., when the refusal related to inputs that were “indispensable” 
(because it could not be objectively duplicated, due to objective legal, technical or economic 
obstacles
103
) for operating in a distinct market, it prevented the undertaking requesting that 
access from supplying a “new product”104 and was not “objectively justified.”105 
     The Court emphasised that the “new product” criteria would be the crucial factor in 
striking a balance between maintaining competition and protecting and fostering 
investment.
106
 Consequently, at least in earlier cases, the Court identified only those inputs 
without access to which the requesting undertakings could not “produce new goods or 
services not offered by the owner of the rights and for which there was potential consumer 
demand.”107 A more extensive view could “upset” the careful balance between effective 
competition and the legitimate interest of the IP owner to exploit her inventions and fostering 
investment.
108
 
     Regarding the approach adopted in respect to “controls on the use of property” by the 
ECHR,
109
 the view adopted in these relatively less recent judgments appears to be consistent 
with the Convention standards. It could be argued that the Court of Justice, just as the 
Convention organs, aimed to ensure that the interests of effective competition would prevail 
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over the exclusivity of IP rights only if the interference with the latter led to genuine technical 
advancement.
110
  
     However, it is questionable whether the above reading remains compatible with the 
current interpretation of Article 102 TFEU in relation to “exclusionary abuses.” More recent 
case law and especially the 2007 Microsoft judgment have heralded an approach which seems 
to privilege, at least in part, the interests of rivals over the incentive to innovate of the 
industrial leader.
111
  
     The Commission stated in its 2009 Guidance on the application of Article 102 to 
exclusionary abuses (hereinafter referred to as 2009 Guidance) that a refusal to grant an IP 
license is likely to infringe the competition rules if the input covered by IPRs is “objectively 
necessary to compete effectively” on a related market, either because it cannot be duplicated 
or, perhaps more importantly, because the input is of “significant competitive importance” for 
the undertakings operating on that market.
112
  
     Consequently, the shift from the concept of “indispensability” to the “objective necessity” 
test now requires the Commission only to prove that without the license, rivals would not be 
able to compete with the same “ease” as the firm owning the IP right.113 As to the other 
requirement that the refusal to license lead to “likely consumer harm,” the Commission stated 
that this concept should be read to encompass cases in which not only the refusal prevented 
the undertakings seeking access from offering products or services that are not a “duplicate” 
of what is already available on the relevant market,
114
 but also if it prevented rivals from 
supplying “improved goods or services for which there is a potential demand” or which 
“contribute to technical development.”115  
     Consequently, the Commission moved away, at least in part, from the “innovation driven” 
concept of “new product” to a less stringent view of technical development, which would 
also cover forms of “follow on” innovation.116 It may not be that this relatively more 
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generous approach confirms to the need to strike a “fair balance” between genuine 
competition and encouraging and rewarding investment.
117
 It is also telling that so far the 
Commission and the EU Courts have been reluctant to accept that the concern for 
maintaining the integrity of investments made by dominant companies could constitute an 
“objective justification” for a refusal to license.118 Importantly, the 2009 Guidance does not 
even acknowledge the possibility for a powerful firm to refuse to grant or to limit the scope 
of an IP licence in order to recoup its costs and thereby protect the value of its inventions.
119
 
     Although, due to the limited remit of this contribution, it is not possible to engage in a 
more detailed analysis, I argue that the Commission relied perhaps too readily on the General 
Court’s conclusions in the Microsoft judgment to justify its views in the 2009 Guidance.120 
However, in doing so the Commission may have overlooked the “exceptional” nature of the 
merits of that case and not given sufficient consideration to the concerns for long term 
innovation which, up to the IMS Health preliminary ruling, had been at the forefront of the 
EU Courts’ jurisprudence.121  
     Additionally, the 2009 Guidance, by emphasising the importance of “follow-on” 
innovation did not wholly “capture” the impact of a forced licence on the long term incentive 
to innovate of individual firms. The Guidance thus appears inconsistent with the concept of 
“proportionality” resulting from the ECHR.122 In respect to the concept of “likely consumer 
harm,” it could be argued that by referring generally to products “contributing to technical 
development” the Commission has not resolved the evidentiary difficulties already 
characterising the “new product” condition.123 Therefore, one may legitimately doubt whether 
the current EU approach meets the requirements of “clarity” and “foreseeability” enshrined in 
the rule of law.
124
 
     Against this background, the “transition” from the restrained approach to prima facie 
abusive refusals to license developed by the Court of Justice to the more “lenient” criteria for 
18 
 
the assessment of these practices adopted by the General Court in Microsoft and perhaps 
more dramatically by the Commission’s 2009 Guidance has led to results that are 
inconsistent, at least in part, with the principles enshrined in Article 1, Protocol I to the 
ECHR. The standards contained in the 2009 Guidance have not only been “diluted” so much 
that they are no longer capable of striking a “fair balance” between the common interest of 
protecting genuine competition and the protection of the rights of individual IP owner. They 
have also become so opaque that they do not allow dominant companies to foresee the 
antitrust law consequences of a refusal to license IP rights.
125
  
     Thus, in respect to the concept of “likely consumer harm”, the approach adopted by the 
2009 Guidance
126
 not only deprives this criterion of any “critical” function in the appraisal of 
these practices,
127
 but also appears to have significantly increased the uncertainty 
characterising the assessment of the legality of a refusal to license, a development which does 
not appear consistent with the “prescribed by law” conditions required by the rule of law 
principles.
128
 If it was already difficult to assess whether the “offshoot” of the exploitation of 
a given invention was genuinely “novel”, it would be even more complex to predict, in 
substance, the direction of the technical development of a specific industry as well as the 
impact of the refusal to license on its course.  
     By contrast, the “new product” requirement established in the IMS decision,129 despite 
presenting some evidentiary difficulties, provided a sufficiently precise paradigm for proving 
the degree of “novelty” of any prospective product.130  However, in light of the 
Commission’s views contained in the 2009 Guidance, it is doubtful that a “move backward” 
to the old IMS test may be forthcoming.    
 
V. Economic Freedom: An Engine As Well As A Limit For Genuine Competition? Tentative 
Conclusions 
19 
 
     The nature of antitrust proceedings as being “criminal in substance” has raised a number 
of concerns as to their compliance with standards of due process laid down by Article 6 of the 
ECHR.
131
 The examination of the current approaches adopted by the Court of Justice and the 
Commission in relation to the privilege against self-incrimination cast doubt on whether the 
level of protection afforded by EU law to the right to remain silent in the course of the 
Commission investigation is consistent with, ultimately, the rule of law.
132
  
     In relation to the parallel jurisdiction at the basis of the Modernisation Regulation, the 
framework for the enforcement of the Treaty antitrust rules, while being aimed to ensuring an 
efficient allocation of cases and the prompt investigation and sanction of competition 
infringements, may be inconsistent with the protection of individual undertakings against 
double jeopardy within the ECN as a whole.
133
 
     As to the power of the Commission to impose antitrust remedies, the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights demonstrates that the Convention allows for limitations on 
the scope of the right of ‘everyone’ to enjoy peacefully their property as well as for 
restrictions in their freedom of contract, subject, however, to several conditions dictated by 
Article 1 of its Protocol I.
134
 In respect to the power of the Commission to impose on the 
holder of an intellectual property right a duty to grant licences to other firms, the Human 
Rights Commission illustrated in its Smith Kline report the needs of innovation and the 
concern for strengthening the drive toward further technological development should be at 
the forefront of the assessment of whether a duty to licence constitutes a “proportionate” 
remedy to terminate an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. However, the European Court of 
Human Rights doubted that the 2009 Guidance on the priorities in the enforcement of Article 
810, as influenced by the 2007 Microsoft decision, could be compatible with the standards 
governing the application of Article 1, Protocol I to the ECHR to compulsory licences and 
especially with the principle of proportionality.  
20 
 
     More generally, discussing the compliance of antitrust remedies with human rights 
standards seems to question whether the current directions of antitrust enforcement have been 
appropriately set and whether the standards governing unilateral exclusionary conduct are “fit 
for purpose”, i.e., capable of reconciling the apparently diverging goals of competition and 
technical innovation. The past ten years have seen considerable success in uncovering anti-
competitive behavior, albeit not without criticism. One hopes that the commitment to the 
ECHR expressed with the Lisbon Treaty will prompt a rethinking of the rules governing 
competition proceedings and remedies. 
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